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The Governance of Islam in Two
Secular Polities: Turkey’s Diyanet
and Indonesia’s Ministry of
Religious Affairs
Martin van Bruinessen
 
Secular republics with elaborate religious
bureaucracies
1 Turkey’s particular form of secularism, laiklik, does not entail the separation of state and
religion but the disestablishment of all independent religious authority and subjection of
the religious sphere to state control. The chief instrument through which the state exerts
its control, Diyanet, has grown into a vast bureaucracy, especially in the wake of the 1980
military  coup.  The  only  other  Muslim-majority  country  that  has  a  similar  large
bureaucratic  apparatus  for  the  administration  of  Islam  is  Indonesia,  also  a  secular
republic  though  of  a  different  kind.  In  both  countries,  secular  elites  attempted  to
enlighten and modernise the ‘backward’ pious segments of their populations through
policies  of  social  engineering  of  religion.  In  doing  so,  they  presided,  wittingly  or
unwittingly,  over  the  consolidation  of  Sunni  orthodoxy  and  the  imposition  of
conservative religious attitudes, at the expense of popular, radical, or progressive forms
of Islamic religiosity. In both countries too, parts of the groups that were the chief targets
of  these  social  engineering  policies  have  succeeded  in  wresting  control  of  these
bureaucratic apparatuses. The modalities of the process were different, however, and a
comparison of these two cases may bring out the specifics of each more clearly.
2 Like Turkey, Indonesia has powerful and well-funded institutions for the governance of
Islam, and a comparison may contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of
state-society relations in both cases. It is striking that these two secular republics have
established such huge bureaucracies for the administration of Islam, which are far larger
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and more pervasive than those in most states that define themselves as Muslim or Islamic
and formally recognise Islamic law. The budgets of these religious establishments have
kept increasing over time and are of comparable magnitude with those of the countries’
military establishments.  Religion,  this seems to suggest,  is  to both states a matter of
national security. Their main institutions for the administration of Islam, the Directorate
of Religious Affairs [Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, usually abbreviated to Diyanet) in Turkey and
the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) in Indonesia, not only have vast administrative
bureaucracies  but  also  administer  standing  armies  of  religious  personnel:  primarily
mosque personnel [imam, hatip, vaiz] in the case of Turkey, and teaching personnel of
state Islamic schools [madrasah] and universities in Indonesia. 
3 Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs ranks third among its most costly ministries,
with a  budget  of  IDR 62.2  trillion (EUR 3.85 billion),  which is  just  below that  of  the
national police force and more than half that of the Ministry of Defence. MORA receives a
larger share of the total education budget than the Ministry of Education and Culture.1 
Ministry/institution (Indonesia) Budget allocated for 2018
Ministry of Defence IDR 107.7 trillion [EUR 6.70 billion]
Police IDR 95.0 trillion [EUR 5.90 billion]
Ministry of Religious Affairs IDR 62.2 trillion [EUR 3.85 billion]
of which for education IDR 52.7 trillion [EUR 3.25 billion]
Ministry of Education and Culture IDR 40.1 trillion [EUR 2.50 billion]
Total education budget (region and centre) IDR 444.1 trillion [EUR 27.55 billion]
4 An exact comparison with Turkish figures is not possible, but the table below shows that
Turkey also earmarks a considerable share of its budget for the administration of Islam.
In Turkey, religious education, which accounts for a very large share of MORA’s budget in
Indonesia, is not administered by Diyanet but by the Ministry of National Education in
Turkey.  For  a  valid  comparison  between  both  countries,  the  budget  for  Imam  Hatip
schools  (where  most  future  Diyanet  staff  are  educated)  should  be  added  to  that  of
Diyanet.2
Ministry/Institution (Turkey) Budget allocated for 2018
Ministry of Defence TRY 40.4 billion [EUR 8.6 billion]
Police TRY 27.8 billion [EUR 6.0 billion]
National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) TRY 2 billion [EUR 0.4 billion]
Ministry of National Education TRY 92.5 billion [EUR 19.8 billion]
of which for Imam Hatip schools TRY 6.4 billion [EUR 1.4 billion]
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Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı TRY 6.8 billion [EUR 1.5 billion]
5 Turkey thus has allocated at least the equivalent of EUR 2.9 billion to the governance of
Islam  in  2018,  and  Indonesia  EUR  3.85  billion.  Considering  that Indonesia’s  Muslim
population is almost three times that of Turkey, the level of Diyanet’s budget is even
more remarkable. 
6 The involvement of these secular states in the religious life of their subjects goes well
beyond security-related surveillance,  and the amounts invested in the governance of
Islam surpasses by a wide margin the corresponding spending by states of comparable
size that have Islam and the Shariah enshrined in their constitutions. Egypt and Pakistan,
where Islam is the religion of the state and the Shariah is accepted as the chief source of
legislation, have rather modest religious establishments and none of the huge apparatus
stretched across the entire country that we find in Turkey and Indonesia (Skovgaard-
Petersen 1997; Nasr 2001). Pakistan does have a Ministry of Religious Affairs, but it is
concerned with little more than the organisation of the hajj.3 The Council for Islamic
Ideology and the Federal Shariat Court are influential but small institutions. In Egypt, the
Azhar and the dar al-ifta’ (the state mufti’s office) define official Islamic views but have no
implementing bureaucracies. The Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) administers
the major mosques in major towns and cities but has none of the wide-ranging control of
sermons that Turkey’s Diyanet has.4 
7 It might be argued that the current high level of expenditure on religious affairs in both
countries  reflects  the  retreat  of  their  present  governments  from previous  secularist
policies. This is undeniably the case, but it is important to note that the expansion of the
religious  bureaucracies  began  in  both  cases  in  periods  of  authoritarian  secularist
government, in the context of the Cold War. In the case of Turkey, this period coincided
roughly with the second half of the twentieth century, marked by military interventions
from 1960 to 1997 that represented secularist ‘corrections’ of too liberal civilian policies.
In the Indonesian case, this was the so-called New Order period (1965-1998), ushered in by
mass killings of up to a million alleged communists and presided over by General Suharto.
In both countries, the ruling governments perceived communism and the left in general
as a major security threat and mobilised Muslims against the communist threat. At the
same time, however, they were wary of any political claims in the name of Islam and
feared Islam as a political force. This was why the existing institutions for the governance
of  Islam,  which  had  hitherto  been  dormant,  were  empowered  and  turned  into
instruments of social engineering. 
8 Seen through this perspective, the existence of well-funded and ever-expanding religious
bureaucracies  in  these  two  republics  does  not  necessarily  contradict  their  secular
character. As will be argued below, it may be understood as an aspect of the particular
varieties of secularism embraced by these countries – quite different from one another
though as they may be – and their strategies to prevent religious groups or ideologies
bringing society and the state under their control. Certain types of secular states may be
in greater need of institutions to shape and discipline religious thought and action than
states that conceive of themselves as religious. The conservative religious segments of the
population that in Turkey and Indonesia were the primary targets of these institutions
and policies have, however, with varying degrees of success, striven to gain control of
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these very institutions, to change their agendas and to turn them into instruments for re-
Islamising the state. 
 
Two types of secularism
9 The republics of  Turkey and Indonesia represent two varieties of  secularism. Neither
country recognises Islam formally as the state religion, although in practice it enjoys a
special status in both. One cannot be a proper Turk without being a Muslim, whatever the
Constitution says (‘every citizen of Turkey is a Turk’), and although Indonesia recognises
six religions, Islam clearly dominates, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs is de facto the
Ministry of Islam. In both republics there is a degree of separation of state and religion,
but the modalities of the relations between state, society and religion are quite different. 
10 The Islamic resurgence that began in the 1970s and the increasing social and political
activism visible in other religions have led to various attempts to revise the classical
secularisation thesis (in which Casanova’s work stands out as a landmark) and a broader
interest  in  the  variety  of  patterns  of  secularity  and  secularism  (or  secularities  and
secularisms,  as  some would  have  it) (Casanova 1994;  Calhoun,  Juergensmeyer  & Van
Antwerpen 2011; Asad 2003). Secularisms emerged in the Western world as the result of
quite different historical trajectories. At least three different types may be distinguished: 
• Separation of state and religion in order to protect religion from politics and to guarantee
religious freedom. The United States of America,  which considers the Pilgrims, who fled
religious persecution in Europe, as its founders, represents the most radical example of this
type of secularism. Religion is highly present in the public sphere, and all religions have
great  freedom  to  play  public  roles.  The  state  does  not  identify  itself  with  any  specific
religion, although public ceremonies are pervaded with prayers and references to God –
something Robert Bellah termed ‘civil religion.’ (Bellah 1970) 
• Separation of state and religion in order to protect the state and the political process from
interference by religion. In its most radical form we find this type of secularism (laïcité,
‘laicism’) in France, where revolutionaries had to conquer political space from domination
by  the  powerful  Catholic  Church.  Religion  is  largely  banned  from  the  public  sphere;
conspicuous symbols of religious identity are not allowed in state schools and other public
institutions.  Less  radical  forms  of  separation  exist  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the
Scandinavian countries, which have established churches, and in countries like Germany,
where the state provides certain facilities to the church.5
• Neutrality of the state towards religions (in the sense of equal distance towards all
religions). This variety of secularism typically emerged in multi-religious societies with long
histories of inter-religious conflict. India is the most prominent example (where secularism
is  under  permanent  threat  from  Hindu  fundamentalists).  The  Netherlands,  where
Protestants  and  Catholics  long  fought  each  other,  constitutes  another  case.  Under  the
conditions of this type of secularism, rights and privileges available to (the adherents of)
one religion, are also available to other religions. Indonesia is a typical representative of this
type of secular regime. 
11 Turkey’s  laiklik obviously resembles France’s  laïcité but with the major twist  that the
protection of the state from religion goes well beyond separation to a pervasive effort by
the state to define, shape and control religion. Turkey was the first country in the Muslim
world to completely abolish the Shariah,  including elements of family law that other
modernising countries maintained, and to replace most traditional Islamic institutions
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with ones based on Western examples (Kuru & Stepan 2012). The major exception was the
office of the shaykh al-islam and its late Ottoman successor, the Ministry of Shariah and
Pious Endowments [Şeriat ve Evkaf Vekaleti], which was replaced by an institution that has
no  Western  counterpart.  Diyanet became  the  Republic’s  major  institution  for  the
governance of religion. For its proper functioning and its social reproduction – especially
when it gained importance after 1950 – it came to depend on the institutions for the
education of  religious  personnel,  the lycée-level  Imam Hatip Schools,  the Institutes  of
Higher  Islamic  Studies  [Yüksek  İslam Enstitüsü]  and the Faculties  of  Theology [İlâhiyât
Fakültesi]. 
12 Indonesia is home to a dozen large ethnic groups and perhaps as many as two hundred
smaller ones. Muslims constitute somewhat less than 90 per cent of the population; the
remainder are Catholics, Protestants, Hindus or Buddhists, or adhere to Chinese religion.
The religions are not evenly spread; the Western and central parts of the Archipelago are
predominantly Muslim, but Hindus are the largest group in Bali and Christians in most
parts of East Indonesia. During the late colonial period, Islamic activists tended to be
wary  of  collaboration  with  the  Dutch  Indies  authorities,  who  in  turn  were  highly
suspicious of their Muslim subjects. The small Bureau for Indigenous Affairs, headed by
prominent  Dutch  scholars  of  Islam,  exerted  a  fair  degree  of  influence  over  the
Government’s Muslim policies (there were no corresponding policies for other religions).
An important function of the Bureau consisted of the surveillance of religious teachers
and organisations and early warning of dangerous radical tendencies.6 
13 The Japanese occupation (1942-45) effectively ended Dutch rule, though the Dutch were
to  attempt  to  restore  their  empire  in  the  immediate  post-war  years.  Perceiving  the
potential  of  Islam as  an  anti-colonial  force,  the  Japanese  made  successful  efforts  to
politicise  Muslim leaders,  providing them with political  education and basic  military
training.  Muslim groups  and  associations  were  mobilised  as  self-defence  forces,  and
merged into an umbrella organisation, MIAI, that was to develop into the chief Muslim
political party, Masyumi.7 In the struggle for independence (1945-49), Islam served as a
unifying factor bringing many different ethnic groups together as a single nation, and
Muslim groups trained by the Japanese played a large role in the actual fighting. 
14 Because  of  the  dominant  role  of  Muslims  in  the  Independence  struggle,  Muslim
nationalist leaders felt that independent Indonesia should be an Islamic state, or at least
that Islam should be privileged as the dominant religion of the state. The state ideology
Pancasila (‘Five Principles’), drawn up by secular nationalists, summed up moral values
broadly shared by the country’s numerous cultural traditions, and does not refer to any
specific  religion  but  listed  the  belief  in  God  as  one  of  the  five  principles.  Muslim
nationalists  wished to add a few words to this  principle,  entailing the obligation for
Muslims to live in accordance with the Shariah.8 They were dissuaded from pressing this
demand by their secular-minded peers, who argued that Christians might feel threatened
by it, and East Indonesia might wish to secede from an Islam-dominated state. 
15 The secular-minded nationalists who carried the day explicitly referred to ‘the way of
Turkey’ as the best way of accommodating state and religion. The secular order that they
put in place was, however, very unlike Turkey’s laiklik. Religion in general, formulated as
‘Belief in God’ was endorsed as a core value, and was elevated as the first principle of
Pancasila. No single religion should be a source of legislation, but all the major religions
existing in Indonesia were given equal recognition and equal rights.9 It is for good reason
that Alfred Stepan, in his survey of various secularisms, singled out Indonesia for its
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deliberate  choice  of  religious  pluralism,  contrasting  this  with  the  lack  of  religious
freedom and rejection of pluralism in Turkey (Stepan 2011; Künkler & Stepan 2013). 
 
Institutions: Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs
and Council of Ulama (MUI)
16 It was a secular-dominated government that in 1946, while the struggle for independence
was still going on, established a Ministry of Religious Affairs as a gesture towards the
committed Muslims. Its ministers and staff were drawn from Muslim organisations, but
those  in  the  top  echelons  had  a  Western-type  education.  The  Ministry  was,  in  an
important sense, the successor to the Dutch and Japanese bureaus for the surveillance of
Islam. The Ministry has small directorates for other religions too, whose directors and
staff are adherents of those religions, but it  was from the beginning very clearly the
ministry  for  and  of  Muslims.10 In  due  time,  the  Ministry  came  to  control  religious
education in state schools, the Islamic courts (which administer marriage, divorce, and
inheritance matters), religious endowments [waqf], charity [zakat, sadaqa], and the hajj. In
the  first  decades  of  its  existence,  the  Ministry  was  the  main  vehicle  of  governance
through which committed Muslims attempted to impose their view of Islamic norms on
the 90 per cent of the population who were at least nominally Muslim. In the view of
many Muslim activists, the Ministry should have the task of improving the quality of
Indonesia’s Muslims and their religious practice. In the words of the last minister of the
Sukarno period, Saifuddin Zuhri (1962-67), who supported the President’s nationalist and
anti-imperialist policies, the Ministry had a major task in nation-building, for religion
was a crucial element of that process (Muhaimin 1998). 
17 The Ministry also had some importance as an employer:  it  was the only government
department  where people  who had no modern school  diplomas and only a  religious
education could find prestigious employment as civil servants.11 Competition between the
major traditionalist and reformist associations for control of the Ministry, at the national
and local levels, was often fierce. The most vocal criticism of the Ministry came not from
secularists or minority groups but from committed Muslims who did not feel represented.
12
18 Under the authoritarian rule of Suharto (1965-98), the Ministry came to be used more
consistently  as  the  chief  apparatus  for  the  governance  of  Islam.  Having  physically
destroyed the Communist Party and the left in general, Suharto and his generals were
extremely wary of  political  Islam,  the one remaining ideology with a  potential  mass
appeal.  Suharto was himself  a  nominal  Muslim,  an adherent of  syncretistic  mystical-
magical beliefs; his generals were either Christians or nominal Muslims like him, and in
the first decades of his rule there was a pervasive distrust of organised Islam. 
19 Suharto broke the control of the Muslim associations NU and Muhammadiyah over the
Ministry.  In  1971  he  replaced  the  last  NU-affiliated  Minister  by  a  Western-educated
scholar  of  comparative  religion,  A.  Mukti  Ali,  under  whom the  Ministry  became  an
instrument of social engineering (Munhanif 1998). It was charged with the task of shaping
the  sort  of  Islam  that  was  compatible  with  and  supportive  of  the  new  regime’s
development policies, and it received a rapidly increasing budget to carry out its mission.
The Ministry presided over the expansion of ‘modern’ religious education, in the form of
state madrasas with a 70 % general  and 30 % religious curriculum, and state Islamic
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universities (IAIN: State Institutes of Islamic Studies) that were expected to produce a
class of  enlightened religious bureaucrats and scholars.  From the 1980s onwards,  the
Ministry sent large numbers of graduates of these universities abroad for postgraduate
studies, some to Middle Eastern countries but the brightest of them to universities in
Europe, North America, Australia or Japan (where they mostly studied the humanities and
social  sciences of religion).  Upon return, they were to fill  the higher echelons of the
religious bureaucracy or the teaching staff of the IAINs (Jabali & Jamhari 2003). 
20 In 1975, Suharto in addition established a national council of Islamic scholars, Majelis
Ulama Indonesia (MUI), which had as its explicit aim to provide religious legitimation to
the  government’s  development  policies  (such  as,  for  instance,  the  family  planning
program, which was quite controversial in Muslim circles). Members of the council were
government-appointed  and  its  composition  reflected  the  spectrum  of  moderate
mainstream Islam. The council became Indonesia’s main fatwa-issuing body and at times
some coercion was applied to make sure the fatwas corresponded with the government’s
needs (Bruinessen 1990, 1996; Ichwan 2006). The MUI has no monopoly of fatwa issuing;
the  large  Muslim  associations  have  their  own  bodies  and  procedures  for  answering
religious questions, and even individual ulama may publish fatwas on issues of public
concern. But the MUI’s opinions had the weight of government recognition. Not all of its
fatwas have been in response to the government’s needs. The MUI has distinguished itself
also by the zealous investigation and condemnation of heretical or ‘deviant’ sects and
religious practices, and it has made efforts to persuade the government to take measures
against such heresies. 
21 Through the Ministry of Religion and the Ulama Council,  the New Order government
positioned itself as neutral between (recognised) religions but interventionist in Muslim
affairs:  the  state  defined  what  constituted  acceptable  religion  and  became  heavily
invested in promoting religious orthodoxy. 
22 The Ministry has in each province, district and sub-district offices for religious affairs
that conclude and register marriages (only for Muslims), supervise religious education
and  preaching,  and  provide  zakat and  hajj services.  The  religious  courts  were  also
administered (and the judges and other personnel salaried) by the Ministry until 2004,
when new legislation placed them administratively and financially under the Supreme
Court. 
 
Institutions: Turkey’s Diyanet, Imam Hatip schools,
Faculties of Theology
23 The Directory of Religious Affairs [Diyanet İşleri Reisliği, later Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı] was
established in 1924, the year in which madrasas and Shariah courts were closed and the
office  of  the  shaykh  al-islam abolished.  Diyanet  was  to  fill  the  vacuum left  by  these
institutions  and  to  provide  enlightened  guidance  to  and  supervision  of  people’s
religiosity. The old structure of provincial and district muftis remained in place and was
brought under the new Directorate. The choice of ‘Diyanet’ rather than ‘Din’ for the name
of the new institution was significant: diyanet refers to all matters of religion outside the
judicial sphere.13 The Directorate’s tasks were defined as ‘purging religion of superstitious
beliefs and practices’ and reconciling religion with the republican reforms and republican
ideology (Kara 1999: 229-230). 
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24 The prayer leaders and preachers [imam, hatip and vaiz] attached to the major mosques
continued to receive salaries from the state – the administration shifted a few times
between Diyanet and the Directorate of Pious Endowments and finally remained with the
former. Diyanet had to supervise the content of the Friday sermon [hutbe]  and other
sermons [vaaz], ensuring these reflected an interpretation of Islam that was compatible
with modernity. In practice it was the mufti who, besides his primary task of answering
religious questions, had to keep a close watch over the hatip and vaiz, providing them
with model sermons and keeping a record of the content of sermons in his district. A
limited number of schools for the training of imams and hatips with the proper modern
attitudes was established from 1924 onwards. An American who visited the first of these
Imam Hatip Mektebi, in the late 1920s, was warmed by the spirit of religious reform he
perceived: “The director ... had ... an enthusiastic belief in the possibilities of reforming
Islam to become a vital and inspiring force in the life of the new Turkey.” (Henry E. Allen,
quoted in Jäschke 1951: 122) 
25 In  spite  of  this  enthusiasm,  during the  years  of  high Kemalism (roughly  1930-1950),
Diyanet appears not to have been a very dynamic or influential and effective institution.
The number of students at Imam Hatip schools, moreover, declined and the last of these
schools closed during the 1930s.  Things changed after the transition to a multi-party
system and the accession to power of parties based on the conservative rural vote. As
early as 1950, under the first DP government, there were efforts to give Diyanet more
muscle, partly on the basis of draft legislation that had been prepared since the late 1930s
(Ibid.: 88-110; Jäschke 1965; Gözaydın 2009: 16-37). Some of the advocates of a stronger
Diyanet argued that, in the name of secularism, its ties with the state should be loosened,
but those who considered the institution essentially as part of the state and potentially a
useful means of control prevailed.14 
26 It  is  perhaps  a  reflection  of  the  changing  perceptions  of  Diyanet’s  significance  as  a
political  instrument  that  it  became  more  frequently  subjected  to  direct  political
intervention. Whereas the first three Diyanet presidents held their positions for life, most
of the later appointees were removed before completion of their five-year term, some
even within less than a year (Kara 1999: 233-238).15 There were also concerns about the
dearth  of  well-trained  Islamic  scholars  with  the  proper  ‘progressive’  and  ‘secularist’
mindset, and not wishing to leave that crucial need unattended, the state established a
new type of school of intermediate level for the training of imams and hatips, from which
a minority of graduates might continue to higher education in Islamic studies (Reed 1955,
1956, 1957; Jäschke 1977; Seufert 1999b). 
27 The Imam Hatip schools,  whose  numbers  rapidly  increased in  the  second half  of  the
twentieth  century,  were  a  response  to  two  distinct  but  potentially  contradictory
demands.  On  the  one  hand,  Diyanet  and  the  government  at  large  needed  mosque
personnel with a progressive attitude and academic knowledge of the basics of Islam to
replace the hoca who were still steeped in mystical-magical lore; furthermore, to maintain
and  raise  the  quality  of  its  bureaucrats,  Diyanet  itself  needed  personnel  with  an
appropriate higher education in Islamic studies. On the other hand, large segments of the
population resented the closure of the madrasa and wanted a madrasa-type rather than a
purely secular education for their children. Many students attending Imam Hatip schools
never intended to become just prayer leaders in a mosque but had their eyes on other
fields of professional activity while cultivating personal piety. From the 1970s onward,
the admission of Imam Hatip graduates to higher education (and especially to police and
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military  academies)  became  an  issue  of  fierce  contestation  between  secularists  and
Islamists. 
28 Besides formal education and sermons,  the fatwa is  another,  more individualised and
contextualised,  form of  religious  guidance.  The  local-level  mufti presumably  answers
religious questions orally, but for more serious or frequently asked questions there is a
higher instance at the central level. That is Diyanet’s Supreme Council for Matters of
Religion [Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu], which answers questions from individuals and issues
fatwas. The common form of question-and-answer has been by written correspondence.
More recently, one could also request a fatwa by telephone, and even more recently this
has been replaced by the e-fatwa, to be requested from the Council’s website.16 
29 Some of Diyanet’s recent fatwas have drawn ridicule or angry comments in the press and
in social media because they conflicted with the modern ‘enlightened’ values Diyanet was
originally supposed to represent.17 Unlike Indonesia, the government of Turkey has, to
my knowledge, not requested specific fatwas from Diyanet to legitimise specific policies.
In the past decade and a half, it has been the prominent theology professor Hayrettin
Karaman rather than the President of Diyanet who repeatedly voiced opinions providing
religious legitimisation of decisions and actions taken by Erdoğan as Prime Minister and
President. 
30 Some of Diyanet’s fatwas are not issued in response to a concrete question but appear to
be inspired by the desire to correct or reform existing religious beliefs and practices. That
is the case of the do’s and don’ts of the Supreme Council’s website; it is even more clearly
the case of the billboards with instructions put up at some of the shrines that are the foci
of popular religious devotion. At the shrine of Eyüp for instance, the most popular place
of pilgrimage in Istanbul, Diyanet’s district office (the müftülük) posted billboards stating
explicitly what constitutes proper practice and what is forbidden. Grave visitation, the
signs  said,  is  sünnet,  a  praiseworthy tradition deriving from the Prophet;  the  visitor
should greet the dead person in the grave and recite verses of the Qur’an for the benefit
of his or her soul. Then followed a long list of ‘superstitious’ practices that ‘have no place
in our religion’ and are harmful, such as lighting candles, placing wishing-stones on the
grave or tying strips of cloth to the shrine or the trees in front, throwing money on the
grave, wearing amulets, making vows with the sacrifice of a cock or turkey, etc.18 
31 All shrines had been closed in 1925, along with the ban of Sufi orders, in an attempt to
abolish  backward  and  superstitious  practices  once  and  for  all.  Right-of-centre
governments reopened the shrines and allowed Sufi orders to resume some activities. The
thrust  of  state intervention shifted from repression to reform. Although most of  the
founders of the Republic were hardly strictly orthodox and conscientiously practising
Muslims, the state has consistently endorsed the Hanafi Sunni mainstream view against
all  varieties  of  popular  religiosity,  esoteric  Sufism,  Alevism  and  other  forms  of
heterodoxy. 
32 This  brings  us  to  the  role  Diyanet  and  MORA  have  played  in  the  struggle  against
superstition, heresy and deviant sects. This went in both cases well beyond the issuing of
fatwas against superstitions and deviant practices. 
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The state as the champion of orthodoxy
33 When  Indonesia  gained  Independence,  perhaps  not  more  than  half  of  its  nominally
Muslim population  practised  the  canonical  obligations  more  or  less  regularly.  Spirit
beliefs and magical-mystical practices were common, and a ritual that has no place in
orthodox Islam, the slametan, a food offering and meal to propitiate spirits, constituted
the main cohesive force of many local communities. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz
famously described three distinct styles of religion that he encountered in East Java in the
mid-1950s, which he called santri, abangan and priyayi. Geertz’s santri were the ‘orthodox’,
scripturalist  Muslims,  of  whom  the  rural  mass  was  oriented  towards  the  pesantren,
traditional  schools  that  teach  classical  Arabic  texts  on  doctrine  and  prescriptions,
whereas the urban population was more influenced by reformist doctrine and modern
schools  teaching overwhelmingly  secular  subjects.  The abangan were  syncretists,  had
little  knowledge of  scriptural  Islam,  viewed the world around them as  teeming with
spirits and other invisible forces besides the one God of Islam, and had the slametan as
their  chief  ritual.  The  priyayi were  the  traditional  aristocracy  and  held  learned  and
sophisticated variants  of  abangan beliefs  known as  kepercayaan (‘beliefs’)  or  kebatinan
(‘esotericism’), in which meditation and the metaphysical interpretation of wayang plays
figured prominently.19 Geertz’s (1960) three patterns were not meant to denote distinct
social groups (although his work has been received as if it did); he was aware that any
single person might partake in each of these styles in certain contexts. Nonetheless, there
were a large number of people who were primarily abangan. 
34 Both  Sukarno  and  Suharto  personally  adhered  to  abangan beliefs  and  practices,  and
Suharto’s generals, as said, were either abangan or Christian and were suspicious of santri.
It is therefore surprising to find that by the end of the Suharto era, the abangan appeared
to have virtually disappeared. Even Suharto himself had gradually shifted his position,
had come to  depend on santri spiritual  advisers  replacing  his  abangan teachers,  and
around  1990  had  allied  himself  politically  with  former  santri opponents.  The
disappearance of the abangan was not due to a single cause and the explanations that
have  been  suggested  are  inevitably  complex,  but  besides  economic  development,
urbanisation and the spread of mass education, state policies were crucial in the process.
20 
35 The mass killings that accompanied Suharto’s rise to power in 1965-66 targeted alleged
communists,  most  of  whom were  abangan.  The  new regime  embarked  on  a  massive
program of ideological indoctrination (‘pembinaan’, building up) to turn the segments of
the  population  whose  loyalties  were  suspect  into  loyal  and  obedient  subjects.  The
program was carried out jointly by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of
the Interior, and it involved basic Islamic teaching. In all schools, religion became an
obligatory subject taught two hours per week – and only the five recognised religions
were taught. Efforts by the kebatinan movements to gain recognition as a sixth official
religion (around which the abangan might  conceivably  gather)  failed.  They were not
banned but redefined as ‘cultural traditions’ and excluded from mention in the religion
curriculum (Stange 1986). 
36 Non-state actors also played a major part in the conversion of abangan to santri Islam.
Muslim associations sent preachers and missionaries to districts known as abangan, and
organised  Muslim rituals  (readings  of  devotional  texts  about  the  Prophet,  collective
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recitation of litanies, etc.) to replace wayang and other less Islamic celebrations. These
were probably more effective than the activities sponsored by MoRA. 
37 Around 1990 Suharto relinquished his last abangan allies, went on the hajj, embraced the
emerging Muslim middle class, allowed the establishment of an organisation of Muslim
academics, opened an Islamic bank, founded a pro-Islamic newspaper, and succeeded in
turning  reformist  and  even  fundamentalist  Muslims  into  his  political  allies  (against
Christians, abangan, and liberals). The 1990s were a period of increasing visibility of Islam
in the public sphere. For ambitious social climbers, it was a wise choice to show oneself an
observant Muslim, and this has remained the case ever since. 
38 Turkey has experienced a similar process of Islamisation of the public sphere and the rise
of a well-to-do Muslim middle class with conservative tastes. A major difference between
the two countries is, however, the survival in Turkey of Alevism, which has consolidated
itself  as  an  alternative  version  of  Islam  without  formalised  Shariah.  Like  the
disappearance  of  the  abangan in  Indonesia,  the  transformation  of  Alevism  from  a
dispersed  rural  phenomenon  to  a  more  cohesive  urban  and  transnational  religious
movement  was  a  complex  process,  influenced  by  many  different  factors.  To  a  large
extent, the modern Alevi movement emerged as a defensive reaction to the state’s efforts
to impose a version of Hanafi Sunni Islam on all of society. 
39 Diyanet’s task was to rid Islam of two enemies of progress, hurafe (superstition) and irtica
(‘reaction’,  meaning all  sorts of  fundamentalism or Islamism).  In the Cold War years,
communism  was  defined  as  the  number  one  national  enemy,  and  Islam  was  to  be
promoted as the best antidote to communism. As in Indonesia during the early Suharto
years,  the elite might not be practising Muslims themselves but they believed it  was
better for the masses to be pious. A delicate balance had to be found and maintained
between endorsing Islam and fighting Islamism. Special care was therefore given to the
promotion of an ‘enlightened’ Islam compatible with the national ideology. 
40 The Suharto regime initially opted for a more liberal version than Turkey was to do. The
chief Muslim legitimiser of the secular New Order, Nurcholish Madjid, studied in the US
under Fazlur Rahman and was a staunch defender of religious pluralism; the Ministry
sent promising graduates to study in the West and stimulated the humanities and social
sciences-based study of Islam at the IAINs. In Turkey, the Faculty of Theology in Ankara
followed a similar course and became the country’s main centre for hermeneutics of
Islam, where in the 80s and 90s the influence of the prominent Muslim thinker Fazlur
Rahman (as well  as Hasan Hanafi  and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd) was strong.21 The state
ultimately opted for a more conservative and nationalist ideology, the ‘Turkish-Islamic
synthesis’, which was first formulated by right-wing intellectuals in the 1970s, and then
adopted as the state ideology by the military regime after the 1980 coup d’état and made
into an obligatory part of the school curriculum (Kaplan 2002; Copeaux 1999; Çetinsaya
1999). 
41 Diyanet was given an important role in the formulation and propagation of the Turkish-
Islamic synthesis, which its longest-serving president, Tayyar Altıkulaç (in office from
early  1978  to  the  end  of  1986),  carried  out  with  apparent  enthusiasm.  Under  his
presidency, Diyanet was perhaps more active and more successful in implementing state
policies than under his  predecessors.  This  was the period of  expansion into Western
Europe, where many opponents of the regime had found a safe haven and had started
organising. With its army of attachés for religion [din müşavirleri] in the consulates and
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embassies and imams in the Diyanet-controlled mosques, Diyanet began acting as the
long arm of the Turkish regime in Europe. Most of the local mosque committees that did
not belong to the Süleymancı or Milli Görüş networks (which had been the pioneers of
organising Turkish Muslims in Western Europe) were brought directly under Diyanet, and
the Directorate henceforth aggressively expanded its own network. There were frequent
reports  that  the  din  müşavirleri were  in  fact  intelligence  officers  and  developed  the
mosques into a spying network. 
42 The post-1980 offensive  to  impose the Turkish-Islamic  version of  orthodoxy through
school  education  and  mosque  construction  led  to  a  strong  reaction  among  Alevi
communities and may be considered as the chief factor in the Alevi resurgence. Alevism
was praised by sections of the Kemalist elite as a specifically Turkish version of Islam
without Shariah and a useful ally against irtica, but de facto discrimination and suspicion
of Alevis as potentially subversive continued for most of the Republican period. Diyanet
officials had often expressed strong criticism of Alevism; its president Akseki had in 1949
been at the heart of a controversy when he wrote the foreword to a book arguing that
Alevism was beyond the pale of Islam (Kara 2004: 200 n.33). Professors of theology had, in
a missionary spirit, written books and articles arguing that ‘true’ Alevism was compatible
with orthodox Islam but that unfortunately many Alevis’ beliefs and practices deviated
from this ‘true’ Alevism.22 
43 Although quantitative data are lacking, there are strong indications that large numbers of
Alevis gradually adopted Sunni practices after migration to urban centres and attempted
to hide their  Alevi  background,  if  only to get  rid of  the stigma of  this  identity.  The
post-1980 efforts  by the state to speed up this  process  backfired,  however.  Religions
lessons, which had been elective, became compulsory; the new textbooks produced by the
Ministry of National Education were inspired by a conservative and nationalist Sunni
spirit and contained passages that Alevis considered insulting. The state built mosques in
villages where there was none (i.e., Alevi villages, in most cases) and appointed imams
there, while refusing to recognise Alevi cemevi as places of worship. This overt assault on
Alevi beliefs, practices and institutions provided the impulse for the Alevi resurgence of
the 1990s (Vorhoff 1995).23 
44 Unlike  Indonesia’s  abangan and  kebatinan,  Turkey’s  Alevis  have  not  faded  away  and
assimilated  to  a  national  Hanafi  Sunni  consensus  but  have  to  some  extent  become
consolidated as an alternative, not state-supported version of Islam. One section of the
broader Alevi movement, represented by the CEM Vakfı, has made efforts to gain official
recognition and representation in Diyanet on an equal basis with Sunni Islam, but neither
the secular government coalitions of the 1990s nor the AKP governments have shown any
willingness to reconsider the exclusive endorsement of Sunni orthodoxy (Walton 2013). 
 
Muslim civil society and the state
45 Turkey and Indonesia differ considerably in the degree to which they allow independent
organisation of society. Indonesia can boast the largest Muslim associations in the world,
with tens of millions of members / followers, and had, in several periods of its history,
large Muslim political parties. The traditionalist association Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was in
fact until 1973 also a political party; the largest reformist association, Muhammadiyah,
constituted an important component of the other major Muslim party, Masyumi. In the
elections of 1955, these parties received 18.5 and 21 percent of the vote. Masyumi was
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banned in 1960 because some of its leaders took part in an armed rebellion against the
government. The NU remained firmly allied with Sukarno, along with the Communist
party  (!),  under  the  revolutionary  banner  of  NASAKOM  (Nationalism,  Religion,
Communism).  There  had  previously  been  competition  between  the  NU  and
Muhammadiyah for control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs but since the late 1950s
the Ministry had become a bastion of the NU. 
46 Suharto, who deposed his predecessor Sukarno after a series of upheavals in 1965-66,
embarked upon a policy of depoliticisation of Islam, as well as of society in general. The
political fervour and mobilisation of the Sukarno years gave way to coerced compliance
with a program of economic development and military-led surveillance of society. MORA
was ‘de-NU-ised’ and placed under non-political technocrat ministers. The top Masyumi
leaders  were  not  allowed  back  into  politics  and  refashioned  their  organisation  as  a
vehicle for religious predication [da`wa], the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication
(DDII).  Less prominent former Masyumi leaders were allowed to establish a successor
party, which however never gained much credibility and remained small. 
47 In 1973, all Muslim parties were obliged to merge into a single, closely monitored party
under a compliant leadership. The Christian and nationalist parties had to merge into a
second  party,  while  a  military-dominated  corporatist  body  was  made  into  the  all-
powerful  government party,  Golkar.  A decade later,  all  associations and parties  were
forced to renounce all ideological foundations other than Pancasila; Muslim associations
might define Islam as their belief and identity but not as the source of their political
ideology (Bruinessen  1996;  Ramage  1995) .  It  was  considered  as  one  of  the  greatest
successes of the Minister of Religious Affairs of those years, Munawir Syadzali, that he
managed to  persuade  the  NU and Muhammadiyah to  accept  those  policies.  The  few
organisations that did not comply were effectively marginalised. There was a principled
Islamic opposition to Suharto’s authoritarian rule, most of it allied with the DDII, but it
was under close surveillance and had insufficient popular support to make an impact. 
48 It was only in the post-Suharto period, after a period of transition from authoritarianism
and consolidation of democratic rule, that the process of increasing state control of the
religious sphere was reversed.  Various actors in Muslim civil  society (including some
groups that can hardly be called civil) have been struggling to gain control of powers that
previously  were  monopolised  by  the  state  –  including  the  power  to  define  what
orthodoxy  is.  MORA  became  again  an  arena  of  contestation  between  rival  Muslim
associations,  and  various  radical  Islamic  groups  gained  influence  in  the  MUI,  which
loosened its ties with the state. 
49 Turkey never had strong Muslim associations comparable to Indonesia’s Muhammadiyah
and NU.  The major  forms of  Muslim sociability  are the formations  known as  cemaat
(religious congregations), which lack a formal associational structure and have no overt
form of membership but are structured by informal hierarchical relations of authority.
Because of legal restrictions – Turkish law does not allow associations based on religious
or ethnic identity – they are typically registered, if at all, as vakıf, foundations. This gives
a small group of administrators control of the cemaat’s assets. Some of the cemaat have
their origins in Sufi orders, which following the formal ban of all tarikat in 1925 did not
entirely disappear  but  survived  as  loose  networks  of  followers  loyal  to  families  of
charismatic Sufi  shaykhs.  Others grew out of reading circles studying the works Said
Nursi, Turkey’s most significant twentieth-century Muslim thinker, or emerged around
particularly effective preachers such as Fethullah Gülen. In the multi-party period, cemaat
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s could consolidate themselves to some extent through alliances of convenience with the
major  right-of-centre  parties,  in  exchange  for  block  votes  in  the  elections.  Public
gatherings and other formal activities, however, remained proscribed and each military
intervention  was  accompanied  by  a  wave  of  repression  of  the  cemaats.  Since  the
mid-1980s, cemaats have become increasingly visible and have expanded their activities in
the fields of publishing, education and economic enterprise.24 
50 Members of various cemaats used the leverage their alliance with political parties gave
them to attempt to influence government policy on such issues as the expansion of Imam
Hatip schools  or  to  obtain  influential  positions  within  Diyanet.  During  the  years
1950-1980, rivalry between the various cemaats for influence was, in fact, a major factor in
the internal dynamics of Diyanet. The knowledgeable Ismail Kara gives a few interesting
examples, which also indicate that some of these cemaats at times wielded considerable
influence in the state apparatus: a Diyanet president (Erdem) was fired for refusing to
publish an anti-Nurcu pamphlet written by his deputy, who himself belonged to a tarikat.
Erdem responded with a pamphlet against the tarikat concerned, published in the name of
Diyanet (Kara 1999: 235). 
51 The strongest of these cemaats, during the 1960s and 1970s, was probably the Süleymancı
group, a conservative branch of the Naqshbandiyya tarikat that had a strong connection
with the Justice Party.  The Süleymancı  established a wide-ranging network of Qur’an
courses  that  was  more  successful  than  the  courses  organised  under  the  auspices  of
Diyanet,  presumably  because  conservative  Muslims  had  little  confidence  in  state-
sponsored  interpretations  of  Islam.  The  Süleymancı  were  also  the  first  to  establish
mosques in Western Europe and thereby gained an influence well beyond their numbers
in the Turkish diaspora (Gökalp 1990;  Jonker 2002).  Diyanet in those years only sent
imams  to  Europe  during  Ramadan,  the  month  of  highest  participation  in  collective
worship, but was not very successful in imposing its authority. I remember cases of actual
fights in mosques between the supporters of cemaat and Diyanet imams over who could
lead the tarawih prayers; in one case even a firearm was drawn. Such events must have
been among the reasons for the concerted effort to impose state authority on the Turkish
diaspora through Diyanet (purged of cemaat members and under military control) after
the 1980 military coup. 
52 Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party (MSP) and its various later incarnations
were important vehicles through which conservative Muslim civil society managed to get
a  grip  on government  policies.  The  MSP took part  in several  government  coalitions
during the 1970s and gained a considerable influence in Diyanet during that decade (and
lost it again in the course of the purges carried out in the wake of the 1980 coup). MSP
activists also turned to Europe as an important arena of activity, establishing the Milli
Görüş network of mosque communities, which soon overshadowed that of the Süleymancı
in membership and public visibility. 
53 The Fethullah Gülen community, which by the end of the 1980s had become the most
powerful and successful of the cemaats, differed from the others in a number of respects.
It renounced public expressions of Islamic identity and ordered its followers to adopt a
secularist habitus and prepare for, what Maoists once called, ‘the long march through the
institutions.’ The Gülen movement has always been nationalist and remarkably pro-state;
Gülen’s ideas, as expressed in his transcribed sermons, were not too different from the
state-sponsored ideology of the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis.’ The Gülen movement did not
patronise the Imam Hatip schools but established its own schools, which only provided
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secular  education,  and  exam-prep  courses  [dershane]  as  channels  for  entering  state
institutions. It is not clear to what extent it infiltrated Diyanet; its priorities lay definitely
with other organs of the state. In Europe, the Gülen movement did not establish its own
mosques,  as  some of  the  other  cemaats did;  its  followers  commonly  attended Friday
prayer in Diyanet mosques, even while being wary of the Diyanet imams spying on them. 
54 A quasi cemaat that became increasingly influential during the 1980s and 1990s consisted
of the graduates and sympathisers of the Imam Hatip schools. The MSP and its successors,
when taking part in government coalitions, made great efforts to empower the Imam
Hatip community by expanding the number of schools and granting Imam Hatip graduates
access  to  non-religious  professional  or  academic  colleges  and  universities  (including
police  and  military  academies) (Rutz  1999;  Akpınar  2007) .  An  important  part  of  the
political struggle between secularists and Islamists in the 1990s concerned the careers to
which an Imam Hatip diploma might give access. The ‘soft coup’ of 18 February 1997 dealt
a severe blow to these ambitions with a series of measures that made it almost impossible
for the graduates of Imam Hatip schools to compete with those of ordinary public schools
and resulted in a dramatic drop of enrolment in the Imam Hatip schools. 25 The ban of
headscarves  in  public  schools  was  moreover  reinforced  and  implemented  more
consistently,  making  it  harder  for  women  from  conservative  families  to  continue
education in Turkey. By that time, however, the Imam Hatip community was sufficiently
affluent  and  well-organised  to  send  hundreds  of  students,  many  of  them headscarf-
wearing females, abroad for the university education that was not accessible to them in
Turkey (Çağlar 2013).26 
55 The emergence of a confident, religiously conservative Muslim middle class in Turkey is
closely  correlated  with  the  educational  successes  of  the  Gülen  and  Imam  Hatip
communities. The spectacular rise and success of the AKP in the new millennium may
serve as an illustration of the successful social mobility of the Imam Hatip community.
Erdoğan himself and many co-founders of the party were graduates (and even former
classmates) of the Istanbul Imam Hatip school. 
 
The limits of control
56 The history of the Imam Hatip schools shows that social engineering has its limits and may
backfire.  Designed  to  produce  ‘enlightened’  religious  functionaries  and  foster  an
understanding of Islam that was hostile to communism and socialism and compatible
with  the  Kemalist  Republican  project,  they  became the  Trojan  horse  through which
previously marginalised, conservative religious groups could conquer parts of the state
apparatus. The conditions that made this possible were those of the multiparty system
and coalition governments that had to please major sections of the electorate. Military
interventions served to slow down this  process  but  failed to revert  it.  Moreover the
decision of the post-1980 military regime to adopt the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an
ideological weapon against the left as well as against ‘radical’ Islam further empowered
religious conservatives. 
57 Milli  Görüş  (along  with  its  more  radical  splinter,  Cemalettin  Kaplan’s  caliphate
movement) was purged from Diyanet immediately after the coup and came to depend
much on its  organisation in  Europe (where  it  became one of  the  targets  of  Diyanet
attempts to weaken it during the 1980s and 1990s) (Seufert 1999a; Schiffauer 2010). It was
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primarily a political organisation but it built up a strong mosque network; its imams had
Imam  Hatip and  Theology  Faculty  backgrounds.  In  Turkey,  the  Imam  Hatip network
incorporated  a  much  broader  spectrum  of  religious  conservatives  than  just  those
affiliated with Milli Görüş and the legal pro-Islamic party of the day. Most cemaats, except
perhaps the Gülen community, were represented among the Imam Hatip students and
graduates. 
58 Inevitably,  all  mosque  personnel  as  well  as  a  large part  of  the  bureaucratic  staff  of
Diyanet were recruited from this network, for very few others were qualified. The Imam
Hatip network and its strong roots in the previously marginalised conservative religious
segment of the population constituted a major factor in the electoral success of the AKP
in the new millennium. Co-operation with the Gülen movement allowed the AKP elite to
gradually expand control over organs of the state, against considerable resistance from
the secularist establishment. By 2010, the AKP government, which presumably had more
sympathisers among the Diyanet personnel than any previous government, gained full
control of the institution and gradually turned it into an instrument of AKP policies. The
government embarked on the construction of numerous new mosques and Imam Hatip
schools, raising Diyanet’s budget to unprecedented levels in the following years (Öztürk
2016).
59 It  is  ironic that the instruments of  governance through which the secular state elite
intended  to  control,  modernise  and  reform  the  pious  conservative  majority  of  the
population were gradually taken over by organised groups of the latter and turned into
instruments to gain control of and strengthen their grip on the state. Diyanet became one
of the most reliable fortresses of the AKP government, not only through the political
appointments of its Directors but also because many of its staff had the same background
as  the  AKP leadership.  The  crucial  historical  moment  at  which  the  changed  role  of
Diyanet became apparent was the night of the coup attempt of July 2016. Mosques all over
the country, following Diyanet’s instructions, broadcast the call for people to come out
onto  the  streets  and  oppose  the  military.  Diyanet  had  become  a  vital  tool  in  the
mobilisation, rather than the governance, of the pious masses. 
60 Indonesia witnessed somewhat similar developments following the demise of the Suharto
regime. The change began, in fact, a decade earlier when, due to the end of the Cold War,
Suharto could no longer count on the unconditional support of the United States and
sought to broaden his domestic support by accommodating former Islamist critics and
allowing Islam a greater visibility in the public sphere. Strictly practising Muslims came
to  replace  abangan and  Christians  as  the  dominant  group  in  the  military  and  the
bureaucracy as well as in the government cabinets of the 1990s (Liddle 1996; Bruinessen
1996). Vocal Islamic groups gained an increasing influence on public discourse, and this
trend was accelerated after the fall of the Suharto regime. 
61 The transition from autocratic rule that began in 1998 ushered in a period of unstable
governments  based  on  coalitions  of  a  very  broad  range  of  political  parties.  Secular
politicians, perceiving that they needed to win over Muslim constituencies, tended to
make symbolic gestures serving the agenda of the most vocal (and not necessarily most
representative)  Muslim  groups.  The  longest-serving  president  since  Suharto,  Susilo
Bambang  Yudhoyono  (2004-14),  allowed  conservative,  bigoted  and  intolerant  voices
within  the  umma to  gain  discursive  dominance  and  did  little  to  protect  minorities.
Especially his second five-year term, when he made a particularly unfortunate choice of
man to lead MORA, was a dark period for religious minorities and further empowered the
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more conservative segments of the umma as well as (non-violent) Islamic radicals (Bush
2015; Bruinessen 2013). 
62 The MUI,  which had for most of  the time been the obedient legitimiser of  Suharto’s
policies,  re-invented  itself  as  an  independent  civil  society  actor,  though  claiming  a
privileged position as the authoritative voice of Islam. Although continuing to receive a
modest amount of support from the government, it found a more important source of
financing in the lucrative business of halal labelling, for the food and cosmetics industries
as  well  as  for  banks  moving  into  Shariah-compliant  forms  of  banking.  It  organised
national congresses at which it co-opted new members. In other words, new staff and
functionaries  were  no  longer  selected  by  the  government,  but  neither  did  any
representative body outside MUI itself have a say in this. The new members included
predominantly  men  affiliated  with  conservative  and  radical  movements,  and  largely
excluded liberals and progressives. This composition was reflected in the fatwas that the
MUI issued in the following years. 
63 The council positioned itself firmly on the conservative side of the spectrum and adopted
a  militant  attitude  towards  everything  it  considered  heterodox:  mystical  sects,  the
Ahmadiya minority and the Shi`a, liberal interpretations of Islam, secularism, and the
very  idea  of  religious  pluralism.  The  MUI  began  to  issue  unsolicited  advice  to  the
government, and lobbied to have its fatwas – including anti-minority fatwas– adopted as
the basis of legislation (Ichwan 2013; Crouch 2010). The MUI allowed itself to become a
vehicle for Islamist groups that wanted to change the existing secular order.  Thus it
played a significant part  in the recent actions to prevent the re-election of  Jakarta’s
Christian  governor  and  to  have  him  jailed  for  blasphemy,  thereby  indirectly  also
attacking the incumbent president, Joko Widodo (Scherpen 2017). 
 
Conclusion
64 Both Indonesia and Turkey have during the past two decades seen major political changes
that appear to undermine the hitherto existing secular order. Indonesia’s secular-minded
founding fathers had explicitly referred to Kemalist Turkey as a model for state-Islam
relations to be emulated. Nowadays, it is Indonesia’s Islamists who look at Turkey as the
model  for  wresting  control  of  the  state  from  the  secular  elite.  In  both  countries,
conservative  religious  segments  of  the  population that  had been marginalised if  not
oppressed  by  military-backed  authoritarian  secularist  regimes  during  the  Cold  War
period  have  gained  a  great  amount  of  political  leverage.  Although  these  countries
represent  significantly  different  types  of  secularism,  in  both  cases  the  institutions
through which the secular elites attempted to ‘enlighten’ conservative Muslims and keep
Islamist  political  contestation  in  check  were  transformed  from  within  and  became
vehicles through which Islamists were empowered and began imposing their views on
society at large. 
65 In  Indonesia,  the principle  that  the state  should keep equal  distance to  all  officially
recognised religions formally remains in place, although the de facto influence of Islamic
discourse on state policy has substantially increased. Each of the six recognised religions
has its official body of representatives that acts as an interface with the government as
well as with the other religious communities, and the government favours interreligious
dialogue. Each of the religions is to some extent represented in the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, although the main task of the Ministry has undoubtedly been the administration
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of Islam. Under Suharto, the Ministry adopted positions independent of the major Muslim
associations and their demands, but in the post-Suharto period various factions of the
Muslim umma have gained a foothold in the Ministry and made it a vehicle for partisan,
often conservative, agendas. 
66 The changes in the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars, MUI, were more dramatic. The
Council liberated itself from its role as passive legitimiser of authoritarian government
policies and positioned itself as part government adviser part spokesman for the umma –
and  especially  for  the  more  conservative  sections  of  the  umma.  The  major  Muslim
associations have their representatives in the MUI, but also the more radical Islamist
fringes. For the past fifteen years, the MUI has been at the forefront of a conservative
backlash against progressive interpretations of Islam and tolerance of religious pluralism.
In  several  cases  it  has  acted  in  concert  with  violent  vigilante  groups  intimidating
religious minorities. 
67 Indonesia has a vibrant civil society and enjoys, since the fall of Suharto, a significant
degree  of  freedom of  expression.  It  was  especially  Islamist  and conservative  Muslim
groups that were empowered in the period of post-authoritarian transition, however, and
non-Muslims as well as Muslim minorities (such as the Ahmadiyah and the Shi`i minority)
are in a much weaker position than before. Officially, the state continues the policy of
equal  distance  to  the  recognised  religions,  but  government  has  repeatedly  failed  to
protect religious minority rights, if only out of fear of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the
Muslim  majority.  Radical  preachers  speaking  in  the  name  of  Islam  have  gained  a
dominant voice in the public sphere and impact on policy decisions at various levels of
government. The state of the secular order is precarious. 
68 The developments in Turkey have been even more spectacular. After the 1980 coup, the
military-backed  government  sought  to  promote  a  conservative  religious-nationalistic
doctrine, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, as a means of fighting socialism and communism
as well as political Islam. Diyanet was given an important role in this project, and the
number  of  mosques  and  imams  under  its  control  rapidly  expanded.  Diyanet  was
moreover  tasked with the  surveillance  of  the  Turkish diaspora.  Capable  and reliable
religious functionaries were needed, and the number of Imam Hatip schools expanded
accordingly. These schools became popular among conservative Muslim families because
of the (limited) religious part of the curriculum. Many graduates,  however,  had little
desire  to  become mere  prayer  leaders  and preachers;  they  sought  to  continue  their
education  in  various  professional  or  academic  institutions.  The  educational  and
professional mobility of the community of Imam Hatip graduates was closely correlated
with the emergence of a successful, conservative Muslim business community, and both
lay at the roots of the rise of the AKP. 
69 The AKP (and the Milli  Görüş  movement that preceded it)  was,  to a large extent, an
emancipation movement of the conservative Muslim segments of the population that had
been  marginalised  under  Kemalism.  The  Imam  Hatip schools  played  a  part  in  the
emancipation process. It appears that the old secularist elite have largely been replaced
now by the counter-elite of Erdoğan and his circle with an assortment of pragmatic allies.
Internationally, Erdoğan’s alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist causes
more generally is undeniable, but in domestic politics he has largely refrained from an
agenda of Islamisation. In fact, the change of guard has not seriously affected Turkey’s
particular form of secularism, laiklik. It is true that the government endorses conservative
values, discourages alcohol consumption, and looks kindly on female veiling. Structurally,
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however, little has changed. Religious thinkers, ulama and Sufi shaykhs have not been
empowered, the Shariah is not accepted as a source of legislation, religious thought has
no  significant  influence  in  the  political  process,  the  state  retains  its  monopoly  on
religious  education  and  outreach,  and  religious  congregations  [cemaats]  are  tightly
controlled. All of this is quite unlike the situation in Indonesia. The budget of Diyanet has
continued to increase and most of its personnel no doubt are close to the AKP in social
background and social-religious convictions. However, this has not given the institution a
greater influence in shaping policy and reconceptualising state-Islam relations. Diyanet
remains an instrument of government policy and state interest, as it was before. 
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NOTES
1. Figures  provided  by  the  Indonesian  Ministry  of  Finance,  Informasi  APBN  2018,  Jakarta:
Direktorat  Jenderal  Anggaran,  2017,  https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/media/6886/informasi-
apbn-2018.pdf. 
Education  is  largely  decentralised  and  financed  by  transfers  from  the  central  to  regional
governments, which do not show up in the budget of  the education ministry.  Only religious
education  is  centrally  administered,  through  MORA.  Details  of  the  education  budget  were
released by the State Secretariat:  ‘APBN 2018: Total Anggaran Pendidikan Rp 444,131 Triliun,
Terbanyak  di  Kemenag  Rp52,681  Triliun’,  http://setkab.go.id/apbn-2018-total-anggaran-
pendidikan-rp444131-triliun-terbanyak-di-kemenag-rp52681-triliun. 
2. Data compiled from a variety of Turkish news sources:  http://gazetekarinca.com/2017/11/
mebin-2018-butcesi-belli-oldu-egitime-ayrilan-kaynagin-yuzde-35i-din-ogretimi-icin/;  http://
www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/ekonomi/diyanet-butceyi-alt-ust-ediyor-2063795/;  http://
www.mebpersonel.com/meb/meb-in-2018-butcesi-belli-oldu-h217297.html. The  Imam-Hatip
schools represent the largest 
3. In the state budget,  Religious Affairs  receive around 10 per cent of  the sum allocated for
Recreation, Culture and Religion, while by far the largest share of RCR (c 70 per cent) goes to
Broadcasting  and  Publishing.  See  http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/
Budget_in_Brief_2016_17.pdf. 
4. Recently however, the Sisi administration has empowered the Ministry in an effort to bring all
mosques and preachers under its control (Fahmi 2014).
5. The political theorist Alfred Stepan distinguishes various degrees of separation and speaks of
the ‘separatist model’ as in the US and France, the ‘established religion’ model as in the UK, and
the ‘positive accommodation’ model of Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. In addition
he gives extensive discussion of the ‘respect all, positive cooperation, principled distance’ model
that  he finds in India,  Senegal  and Indonesia  and which corresponds with our third type of
neutrality of the state (Stepan 2011). 
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6. An excellent overview of the role of Advisers and Muslim policies during the last four decades
of Dutch rule is to found in (Benda 1958: 9-31; 61-99).
7. (Benda 1958) remains the best study of the period of Japanese occupation.
8. This  reference  to  the  Shariah,  known  as  the  Jakarta  Charter,  was  to  be  inserted  into  the
Preamble to the Constitution. At several critical points in Indonesian history there have been
attempts to revive the Jakarta Charter, but each time it was rejected by a clear parliamentarian
majority (Boland 1971: passim; Mujiburrahman 2006: 105-133; Hosen 2005). 
9. The formulation of Pancasila and its reference to God several times underwent revision. Belief
in God was raised to the first principle and its formulation changed to make it more explicitly
monotheistic – obliging Hindus and Buddhists to reformulate their own belief systems in those
terms. For debates on Pancasila see (Bonneff, Cayrac-Blanchard and Labrousse 1980; Ramage 1995;
Steenbrink 1998; Raillon 2011).
10. On the early history of the Ministry, see (Steenbrink 1972; Boland 1971: 105-112).
11. As observed by Clifford Geertz in the 1950s, ‘[o]ne of the most important informal functions
of the ministry is (…) to provide jobs for deserving Moslems’ (Geertz 1960: 201).
12. ‘In many places, the local offices of the Ministry are narrowly intertwined with local Muslim
leaders and associations. In those places, there appears to be a real integration. Where this is not
the case, and especially where the Ministry is perceived as the bulwark of one specific association
and political  party,  the Ministry is by many not accepted as representing Islam.’  (Steenbrink
1972: 181). 
13. Explained clearly, with a summary of the debates on this issue, in (Kara 1999: 221ff.). Kara
published an updated version of this rich article in Turkish as (Kara 2004).
14. This wish for an independent religious institution is associated with the name of Prof. Ali
Fuad  Başgil,  who  drafted  concrete  proposals  that  would  have  made  Diyanet  financially  and
morally independent from the state but which were shelved. See (Jäschke 1965: 181-184). 
15. The  major  exception  to  these  short  tenures  was  the  presidency  of  Tayyar  Altıkulaç,  a
nationalist appointed as the head of Diyanet by Ecevit in 1977, who served the post-1980 military
regime very well and lasted eight years until he retired at his own request. 
16. Diyanet’s fatwas have drawn little attention from scholars. The only study that I have seen
was by Jak den Exter, who in 1989 visited the Diyanet offices and could study the questions sent
by migrants in Western Europe and the answers given by the Supreme Council (Exter 1990: 27-38)
. The Supreme Council has a website dedicated to its fatwas, https://kurul.diyanet.gov.tr/, which
is  organised  by  subject  and  very  didactic  in  its  format,  like  any  FAQ page,  abstracted  from
concrete individual questions. It is also possible to submit one’s own question to this page. 
17. In late 2017, the Turkish press reported on three recent Diyanet fatwas on matters that are
less  strictly  religious,  concerning  the  permissibility  of  bitcoin  (which  was  deemed  ‘not
appropriate at this point in time’), men dyeing their hair black (‘not appropriate’), and work in
places  that  sell  alcoholic  beverages  (‘not  permissible’).  See  e.g.  http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-top-religious-body-issues-fatwa-on-hair-dye-123368.  For
an overview of the more controversial fatwas of the past decade, see ‘Son 10 yılda Diyanet’in
tartışma yaratan fetva  ve  açıklamaları’,  BBC-Türkçe,  3/1/2018,  https://www.bbc.com/turkce/
haberler-turkiye-42552621. 
18. On pilgrimage to Eyüp and popular religious practices generally, and official efforts to reform
them, see (Bruinessen 2008).
19. . Forty years later, Andrew Beatty replicated Geertz’ research and reported his findings with
a different emphasis. He found that participants in the same slametan ritual held vastly different
interpretations of the meaning of the ritual and their own intentions in participating (Beatty
1996; 1999). 
20. The most convincing attempt at an explanation is given in (Hefner 1987; 2011). 
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21. For a critical overview of the ‘Ankara school’ of Islamic theology, see (Aktay 2005). It is worth
noting that Turkey and Indonesia were the only countries in the Muslim world where these
thinkers found a significant audience. 
22. This included such men as the professors of Turkish-Islamic literature Ibrahim Agâh Çubukçu
(1980; 1982) and Mahmud Esad Coşan (1990).
23. The role of the diaspora in the Alevi resurgence is highlighted in (Sökefeld 2008). 
24. A well-informed and insightful overview of the cemaat as they flourished around 1990 is given
by (Çakır  1991) .  The  transformation  of  one  particular  branch  of  the  Naqshbandi  Sufi  order,
associated with the İskenderpaşa mosque in Istanbul,  into a cemaat and vakıf is  described by
(Silverstein  2007).  For  an  inside  view  of  the  same  cemaat,  by  a  prominent  politician  and
entrepreneur, see (Özal 1999).
25. In retrospect, this military intervention has been characterised as specifically targeting the
Imam-Hatip schools. The relevant measures are summed up in: Cemal Nar, ‘28 Şubat kararları ve
İmam  Hatipler’,  online  at:  https://www.habervaktim.com/yazar/74917/28-subat-kararlari-ve-
imam-hatipler.html. 
26. This concerted effort to obtain higher education abroad was concentrated in Vienna, and the
Imam-Hatip network there was said to be co-ordinated by Erdogan’s son Bilal. 
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